

1. Introduction

Before speaking about the nature of faith, we should set out the notion of faith in the various fundamental senses of the phrase “we believe”. In the New Testament ^A, the term ‘faith’ can refer both to an act of faith which believes, and the content of faith which is believed in. So, you “hold the conviction that you have as your own before God” (Rom. 14:22) while “the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul” (Acts 4:32), for there is only “one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all” (Eph 4:5-6); and this objective faith can be called a “word of faith” (Rom. 10:8) for us to believe. We could say that faith is “differentiated into being a Christian and the Christian message”¹, and yet this also involves an “objectivizing of the term”² ‘faith’ from a subjective act to an objective principle. In this way, some versions of the creed “read the plural [“we believe], but [other]... versions have substituted it for the singular”³. As well as being divided into act and content, faith is both given to individuals and made definite as it is shared in common. Faith has an objective content and there is an objective group of faithful. But it is differentiated in the process of being an act as well as having content, so it is subjective for the individual faithful.

^A Barth records that “this distinction originates with Augustine” (Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics Study Edition. The Doctrine of the Word of God I.I § 1-7*, trans. Thomas Forsyth Torrance and Geoffrey William Bromiley (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010). 232) when he said that “those things that are believed are one thing, but the faith with which they are believed is another thing” (Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation 45 (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). XIII,2,5, p.375). This distinction is then picked up by scholasticism. Although Augustine was the first to reference these notions of faith explicitly, these types have New Testament roots. e.g., Acts 6:7, Rom. 1:5, 12:6, Gal. 1:23, 3:2,32-5, 1 Tim. 3:9, 4:1,6, 6:20-1, Titus 1:1, 2 Pet. 1:1, Jude 3. (See Walter Bauer et al., *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, 3rd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2001). 820-1, Rudolff Bultmann and Artur Weiser, ‘Πιστεύω’, in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament: Volume VI Πε-Ρ*, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey William Bromiley, vol. 6, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968), 174–228. 213, D, II, 2, e. Horst Balz and Gerhard Schneider, eds., *Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament*, trans. John Medendorp and Douglas Stott, 3 vols (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993). III:94).

How can we understand this distinction between faith as a subjective act that is differentiated between many; and then faith as objective, one and common? We are at risk of either prioritising the content of faith over the importance of the individual act of faith, or of prioritising the act of faith at the expense of the role of the content of faith. The only way to maintain these two aspects of faith seems to be by affirming their equality and refusing to prioritise one over the other. The faith shared in common and the faith of the individual are one, and both must be maintained, for likewise the implication of the New Testament description of faith, is that:

“there is a unity between the faith which is believed and the faith which believes”⁴

and,

“the content of faith is not to be separated from the act of faith”⁵.

From this, we can begin to understand how the objective and subjective aspects of faith relate to how faith actually is in and among those who believe. Augustine accurately grasped ^B the implications of neither reducing faith to an external object or something merely personal when he wrote that faith,

^B In Book 13 of the *Trinitate*, Augustine illustrates ethical aspects of the search for wisdom which he was engaged in (Johannes Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur Des Menschlichen Geistes Nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion Und Erkenntnis Gottes in ‘De Trinitate’* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000). 209 – “zur Darstellung grundlegender Positionen seiner Ethik”; Volker Drecoll, ed., *Augustinhandbuch* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 374 – “setzt Augustine die ethischen Überlegungen fort, indem er die Rolle des Glaubens...”). In short, the treatment of faith comes between his psychology and his understanding of the nature of God. Augustine’s statements open the way to a subjective understanding of God, but at the same time Augustine’s focus is not on that subjectivity of the experience of faith, but only in so far as it is a reflection of God and the Trinity (Michael Schmaus, *Die Psychologische Trinitaetslehre Des Heiligen Augustinus*, 2nd ed., Münsterische Beiträge Zur Theologie 11 (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlag, 1967). 282 – “Augustinus ist weit davon entfernt, die Trias rein subjektiv zu fassen”; 235 – “naturgemäß erscheint eine Dreheit, wenn man den Blick dem Geiste mit sein in immanenten Funktionen”). So, it is completely possible, on Augustinian principles, to move through this investigation in the other way, and expand on his ideal of coming to know God through our internality by making this subjectivity the starting point of theology.

Each of the points made by Augustine about the relation of faith to objectivity and subjectivity requires further explanation. It is necessary to consider Augustine’s understanding of faith as

"does not pertain... to any sense of the body at all, since this is a thing of the heart, not of the body; nor is it outside of us, but in our inmost being; nor does anyone see it in another, but each one sees it in themselves"⁶.

Firstly, faith is 'not bodily'. The presence of faith could be similar to how several people can perceive one physical object from different perspectives. When we perceive an object, we do share in it as each of us experiences it from our own perspective. In Augustine's words, this is the possibility that faith is found just as "in some way the gaze of all who behold it is informed by this one object"⁷. This conception and the reasons for rejecting it can be understood by the nature of the phenomenon of perception. We find that we can always perceive a physical object with closer detail or from another perspective in different ways. And it is wondrous that through this process of constant, unending discovery, "each physical property draws us into infinities of experience"⁸ as we can always turn an object around to look at it even more carefully. At the same time, we all share in the same physical world and explore it together.

But despite this limited analogy, we cannot consider the objective content of faith as just one of many discrete objects if it is to be truly subjective as well. Augustine's description of perception, that "the gaze of all... is informed by this one object", is an example of how Augustine can "distinguish two forms, the form of the perceived object, and the form induced in the sense"⁹. Both in the understanding of Augustine and the insights of phenomenology, perception of external objects is an active process that moves the body through steps to

interior in the light of his own descriptions of self-consciousness: such a 'principle of interiority' was one of the "fundamental lines of Augustine's philosophy... the principles which inspired and qualified it" (Johannes Quasten, *Patrology: The Golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicea to the Council of Chalcedon*, ed. Angelo Di Berardino, trans. Placid Solari (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1986). 407). Augustine's insight must also be explained in terms of the Platonic ideas about self-consciousness which influenced him. The "theory of self-knowledge as a condition of knowledge of anything else... was not Augustine's personal discovery but a transformation of Neo-Platonist concepts" (Edward Booth, 'St. Augustine's *Notitia Sui* Related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-Platonists', *Augustiniana* 28, no. 1/2 (1978): 183–221. 206). Augustine can also be compared with the phenomenological description of self-consciousness, since for Augustine the self was "discernible through an exercise partly resembling the phenomenological reduction... of Husserl" (Edward Booth, 'St. Augustine's *Notitia Sui* Related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-Platonists', *Augustiniana* 29, no. 1/2 (1979): 97–124. 107; cf. Booth, 'Notitia Sui', 1978. 214).

reach the object of perception ^C: it is a mediating process. The Platonic origin of Augustine's concept is the idea that, "whenever the stream of vision is surrounded by... light, it flows out like unto like and coalescing therewith it forms one kindred substance". The language of similarity and 'rays' does reflect something meaningful about perception: it can be said that perception is an active 'seizing upon'¹⁰ where we "send [out] rays of the illuminative regard of attention"¹¹. 'Like meets like', but this is only a similarity which also maintains a distinction, not the kind of interchangeable unity found in faith ^D.

^C Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 85 – "Intentio is an activity: Augustine will give particular emphasis to the active nature of perception". cf. Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation 45 (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). XI,9,16, p.337 – "the species of the body, which is perceived, produces the species which arises in the sense of the percipient...". To understand the Platonic roots of Augustine's concept of perception, O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*. 82, n.8. references Plato, 'Timaeus', in *Timaeus. Critias. Cleitophon. Menexenus. Epistles.*, trans. Robert Gregg Bury, Loeb Classical Library 234 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1929), 1–254. 45c.

Plotinus, *Enneads, Volume V*, trans. Arthur Hilary Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library 444 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984).3.2, p.75 - "the reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images present to it which come from sense-perception, but combining and dividing them". Plotinus rejects Aristotle's account that "sense is that which is receptive of the form of sensible objects without the matter" (Aristotle, 'On the Soul', in *On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*, trans. Walter Stanley Hett, Loeb Classical Library 288 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2–206. 424a:18-9), which was used by Augustine (Edward Booth, 'St. Augustine's *Notitia Sui* Related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-Platonists', *Augustiniana* 28, no. 1/2 (1978): 183–221. 195-6) when he said that the mind "fastens together their images, which it has made out of itself, and forces them into itself. For in forming them it gives them something of its own essence" (Augustine, *Trinity*. X,5,7, p.302). But both Aristotle and Plotinus share the relevant insight that there is a kind of gap at some point in sense perception. While Aristotle says that "sense is a sort of mean between the relevant sensible extremes" (Aristotle, 'Anima'. 424a:6), and, since self-knowledge is a kind of sense for Aristotle (Aristotle. 425b:13-26), the meaning of Plotinus is similar when he says that "the activities of the intellect are from above in the same way that those of sense-perception are from below; we are this, the principal part of the soul, in the middle between two powers" (Plotinus, *Ennead V.3.3*, p.81). In both of these models, the human self is a mediating principle, one which could be between God and the world.

^D Bonaventure actually uses physical sight as an example of the unity of faith, regardless of Augustine's insistence otherwise (Bonaventure, *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia 3 (Quaracchi, 1888). d.23, a.1, q.3, p.479). In fact, it is the very distinction between the "objectum per accidens" and the "objectum per se" which Bonaventure begins with that makes this analogy for

To use the imagery of light again, what actually happens in faith is that “God... has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God” (2 Cor. 4:6); “the prophetic message... a lamp shining in a dark place, until... the morning star rises in your hearts” (2 Pet. 1:19): the presence of the light of faith is much closer to us than anything we could see externally.

By making faith into a perceived object, we would still be creating some division and priority between faith as objective and subjectively perceived. For it is only ever ‘in some way’ that we can come to know a physical object and as we are drawn into further experiences and knowledge of the physical world, we make further determinations about it into ever-more specific parts. Our perception of it is, conversely, “infinitely imperfect”¹². When we look into something physical, we know more about a smaller determined part of it. When we observe an object from one perspective, we necessarily stop viewing it from another perspective as our focus moves from one part to another. In this way, the kind of knowledge which we have of the physical world is “imperfect, ‘inadequate’... given only ‘one sidedly’, in a sequence ‘many-sidedly’, yet never ‘all-sidedly’”¹³. If we had faith as we perceive physical things, then it would be unclear and disjointed rather than ‘one’. For a faithful person, it would not be possible to say that they even grasp the entire faith. Neither would it be possible for one of the faithful to hold the same faith as all of the faithful, as some would perceive it in one way and others in other ways. As ‘the whole group of those who believe’ are defined and united by their belief, with many perspectives on that belief they would no longer be one. The objective unity of faith cannot be differentiated to a subjective unity of believers by means of simple perception.

One of the ‘considerations fundamental’ to the process of phenomenological reflection is the insight that there is always something “co-present - which makes up a constant halo around the field of actual perception”. This too

faith problematic, not necessarily the fact that perception is “diversificetur in specie”. Augustine’s statement that faith is “not one in number, but in kind”, which Bonaventure is trying to prove, should be referred to the plurality of believers rather than the articles of faith (“objecta per se, sicut iposes articulos plures”). Instead, Scotus correctly observed that faith does not have its unity from its first object, which is God, because God is not known as an object. “non potest autem dici quod fides infusa habeat unitatem ex objecto primo, scilicet Deo, quia Deus non movet in ratione objecti ad cognitionem” (John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in Tertium Librum Sententiarum*, ed. Patres Franciscanis, vol. 15, Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia Editio Nova (Paris: Vives, 1894). d.25, q.2, p.248). It is the fact that God’s own nature is not that of an individual limited object which means that faith in God cannot be reduced to a mere object either.

“reaches into the unlimited”¹⁴ and surrounds what we have focused on. Our physical perception is limited both by the limitless detail of individual objects, and the limitless expanse of space which we can conceive of around us. Perception of an external object is limited: both in the depth of our understanding and our temporary focus on one thing and then another. This is not the kind of presence which fulfils the need for a unity and equality between the act of faith and its object. What this consideration shows is that faith is not simply a background to our life and awareness. Neither is it something which is just a set of things which we deal with, to reduce it to just an entity which exists separately from any of those who have faith. Faith is not to be regarded as some thing “to which we may return when we will”¹⁵ or turn away from when we will. We cannot just sometimes cast our gaze onto our faith, or decide how it should be orientated towards us.

For similar reasons, there could not be one kind of act of faith with many varying contents. If the content of faith is to be shared in common, then it must be the principle which gives sense or meaning to the act of faith. The suggestion that our knowledge of the content of faith “need not be at all be an object known and verbalised in the consciousness”¹⁶ similarly separates, both in practice and in principle, the objective content of faith from its act. This also turns faith into a mere object, but rather than being too distant from our shared and personal faith, it is too personal to be shared. If the content of faith is in any sense both internal and shared between many, then it has to be one. The unity between these two works both ways: neither is found without the other, and neither can one be found to a greater extent than the other, because there is really an “interchangeability of concepts”¹⁷ between them.

The issue with prioritising either the act of faith or the content of faith over each other is that in both misunderstandings, faith is not properly made objective and differentiated. When faith is understood as an external object which is apprehended in complexity, then it cannot actually be apprehended objectively in an equal way. And faith loses its content when reduced to only an act, so that it becomes so differentiated that it is no longer one or objective. So, faith can be viewed as an external object but in fact lose its connection to the subjective assent, which is itself an assent to an objective substance of faith. Or faith can be viewed as completely subjectively differentiated, but then lose the objective character which allows for faith to be shared between the faithful. And if faith is something ‘of the body’ in the simple sense, it cannot be shared equally, but if it is an external object ‘outside of us’, it is not fully subjective. If faith is to be both objective and differentiated, then it must be in equal terms understood as an act and as content, as objectively and

subjectively believed. By forcing faith into one extreme, the other aspect of faith is lost. But faith is also made into an object, that is a personal possession, when it is reduced to a subjective act. And also, when we view faith as an external object, our perception of it is completely differentiated and has no objective aspect which we can grasp. So, interpretations of faith as wholly objectivised or subjective completely distort the nature of faith: the objective and subjective aspects of faith rely on and imply each other.

Faith, then, is a ‘thing of the heart, not of the body’, meaning that it is in ‘our inmost being’. Our own internality is different from the external perception of objects. Within itself, the mind can “distinguish itself from that which it knows to be another thing”¹⁸: “the soul should see within itself what it has not seen anywhere else”¹⁹. So, instead of perceiving faith as with an external object, ‘each one sees it in themselves’. Faith is a parallel to our self-consciousness; neither is it accessible to us in another way. The distinction between the things ‘of the body’ which we perceive ‘outside of us’ and that within us is not just to do with orientation, but also with the type of perception that they are. Unlike with a physical object or the parts of the perceiving body, self-consciousness “has no sides that could be presented sometimes in one mode and sometimes in another”²⁰. It is completely one for us because it is present ‘absolutely’, and in this way it has an objectivity for us as there is no possibility of it varying. Then there is a balance between the objective nature of our belief and its internality. All of the faith can be known at the same time as one whole only if it is drawn so deep into our being that it can no longer be observed externally. And then it can also be truly objective if it does not need to be split up among people.

Being correlated with self-consciousness is also how faith can be objectivised by acting and by being shared. Self-consciousness is one of the “conditions on which the possibility of experience depends and that ground it”²¹. It is by self-consciousness that a person “is continuously constituting himself as existing... grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as I, who lives this and that... process... as the same I”²². So, through faith, we come to understand ourselves as faithful throughout the flow of life’s events. Before we engage in the constant work of perception, we understand ourselves as faithful. Just as “the species... of the human is known to us in ourselves”²³, having faith within ourselves is the source of the form of a faithful life, because faith persists through it, determines and identifies each part of it. “For what is so intimately known... than that through which all other things are likewise known”²⁴? This intimacy means that faith comes prior not only to the objects of our ordinary knowledge, but also to the acts of the mind such as knowing and feeling. Faith

is that through which we come to know, in a mind which is faithful. By being fundamental to the self-consciousness of a faithful person, faith is neither too remote as an external objective principle or taken as a personal possession. Rather than being a feature of the subjective life, faith defines this aspect of life and from this position is actually much more capable of presenting itself objectively. Through being correlated with self-knowledge, faith is made all the more present to the faithful and stands in connection to their knowledge, love and self-identity. "The perception of a mental process is a simple seeing of something which is... given as something absolute"²⁵. The presence of faith is 'simple' as it is at the 'inmost', most fundamental part of our being. It can then define the whole person. So, this opens up our understanding of faith as absolute and involving certainty correlated to knowledge; and of faith as something simple, defining a life of faith.

In this way of seeing itself, the mind also knows itself fully. It is well-known that it is impossible for us to doubt that the mind exists because this doubting implies the existence of the mind²⁶. What this implies is that our knowledge of the mind is certain, not just with a very high degree of confidence, but with a categorical exclusion of any doubt. And the content of the knowledge is also complete in such a way; "not... that [the mind] knows wholly, but that what it knows, it knows as a whole"²⁷. For only "a simple thing thinks itself"²⁸. The mind does not come to progressively know itself in part, but the mind "knows itself for no other reason than that it is present to itself"²⁹. Self-consciousness is not something to be acquired at all; for the mind "knows itself at the very instant in which it understands"³⁰. The faithful self is not present as an object is to another observer, which would only be observed in parts. Neither does a faithful person have to work to reach this knowledge all at once. In fact, "in the representation, 'I am', nothing manifold is given at all"³¹ and if "one would be the seer, and the other the seen... this is not self-knowledge"³².

From the certainty of faith, we can see the connection of faith to love. Even our perception of faith involves some 'intimacy' within our own selves, and this intimate knowledge also involves our will or affections. This is how faith is correlated to love, and from the knowledge of faith comes love. As the act of faith itself underlies, defines and distinguishes our entire life, it must have a correlate in the will as well as the intellect. For faith, love and knowledge are found as one and the same within the faithful person; that is, the faithful "mind, love and knowledge... although each is a substance in itself... all are found mutually in all"³³. This mutual relation of faith to other aspects of our life is the converse of the mutual relation to oneself which is self-consciousness. As the mind already knows itself in seeking to know itself, it also "knows what

knowing is"³⁴ and knows its desire³⁵ in self-knowledge. The faithful are "clinging to that same form itself which they behold, in order that they may be formed by it", clinging by love³⁶ and knowledge.

But faith, both as act and as content, is something which is 'objectivised' because it is shared between people as well as held by individuals. This objective view of the relationship between faith as objective and subjective requires a more positive expression, as also given by Augustine:

"as the human countenance is said to be common^E to all, for this is so said that yet each one certainly has their own"³⁷.

This means that faith is "an unmediated given of consciousness"³⁸. In fact, the root of the answer to the problem of the act and content of faith is found in the true relationship between the human person as subjective and as objective, that is between the 'I', and the 'we' who believe. There is already a relationship that exists between any group of people, and faith is simply parallel to this. Not that faith is an external thing of the body, but in the sense that faith, by being immanent, participates in our external life. The appearance and form of the body is, more or less, common to all, while at the same time the variations between our bodies are what distinguish us. As every human is unique in its features and behaviours, a person is identified in contrast with

^E = "facies humana communis". cf. this phrase in TLL, VI, I, p.47, 81-3. This could refer to the whole human form (as in Ovid, Metam. II, v.661) or the face in particular (as in Seneca, Ira, III, 17). Faith, just like self-consciousness, actually knows its own means of perception prior to other things. In contrast, "The eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself... we see bodies through the eyes of the body" (Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation 45 (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). IX,3,3, p.273). What this means is that faith is "is "an unmediated given of consciousness that does not have to be reached by reason", "eine unmittelbare Bewusstseinsgegebenheit, die man nich schlussfolgend errichen muss" (Magnus Löhrer, 'Glaube Und Heilsgeschichte in De Trinitate Augustins', *Freiburger Zeitschrift Für Philosophie Und Theologie* 4 (1957): 385–419. 405.). Perhaps an instructive comparison to this is found in Plotinus description of how "the soul by a kind of delight and intense concentration on the vision and by the passion of its gazing generates something from itself which is worthy of itself and of the vision. So from the power which is intensely active about the object of vision, and from a kind of outflow from that object, Love came to be as an eye filled with its vision, like a seeing that has its image with it" (Plotinus, *Enneads, Volume III*, trans. Arthur Hilary Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library 442 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967).5.3, p.179).

others. And each person has their own ‘heart’ and ‘soul’ because there is one unified kind of human ‘heart’ and ‘soul’.

Faith is also a source of self-identity that is ‘inmost’ to the body. So, the countenance of a person, which is their external aspect but also still a source of identity, is an appropriate analogy for the objective and external aspect of faith. This happens when “the species... of the human is known to us in ourselves, and is likewise presented to the senses of the body from without in others”³⁹. It is only the human countenance which can truly be called an “immanent transcendency”⁴⁰. It is shared in a way that preserves a person’s internal and unique identity, but it is this internality as exterior. In this way, the act and content of faith are one because the subjective aspect of faith is contained within the objective, and vice versa. And faith is known within our inmost selves and also presented between others.

It should then be clear why, if faith itself cannot be perceived, we cannot perceive the faith of others directly. It is the case that “the species... of the human is known to us in ourselves, and is likewise presented to the senses of the body from without in others”⁴¹. But because faith “is not so seen in the heart in which it is”⁴², we cannot just look at the faith of other people in this way. Instead, it must be presented in a way parallel to our perception of the human form, that is, “manifested by some signs... believed rather than seen”⁴³. Because of the plain truth that we cannot experience another person’s thoughts, this way of faith being manifest externally “excludes a direct... showing of the predicates belonging to a [person] specifically, a showing of them in perception proper”⁴⁴. This is a reduction of the way that a person’s physical appearance in the body can be made present for us in person⁴⁵, for faith is not directly something of the body. As well as other people are recognised by analogy to ourselves, the faith of others is seen by yet another level of abstraction. Again, this is the balance between a faith which is external enough to be shared in common, but is still uniquely our ‘own’ faith. And in some cases, “another does not see this [faith in the mind] but believes what the speaker tells him”⁴⁶. This is the ground of the concept of witness, which links together the content of faith between many faithful as one person can believe that another has faith even though the act of faith is a subjective thing of the inmost heart.

In this way, and I think only in this way, it is possible to say that there is one faith shared between many people. For then, faith is “not one in number, but in kind”⁴⁷. The group of faithful should be understood according to their quantity as it is differentiated into many faithful, so the shared content of faith is plural

in the sense that many people hold it. But the group of faithful is fundamentally one in kind, so their shared faith is one and the same kind. When we instead consider the more differentiated and subjective relationship between the act and content of faith, the variation in kinds of people which distinguishes an individual means that, while the kinds of faith are numerically one, each of the faithful holds it in a qualitatively different way (e.g. mixed with other feelings). Yet each person holds only one faith. This is because humans in groups are not completely different and also “not the same, but similar”⁴⁸. When viewed objectively as a group, they are one in kind and many in number, but subjectively differentiated we are one in number and defined by our many kinds. It is the community of people itself which links these two aspects of similarity: our difference and equality. And faith, whether it is viewed as subjective or objective, act or content, is parallel to all of this. So, it is the community of faithful which links the subjective act of faith to being shared with one objective content.

It is only in this way that the faithful together can be called “one body... members one of another” (Rom. 12:4-5, 1 Cor. 12:12). In faith, we are not exerting ourselves and operating by individual acts in our members or body parts. Instead, as faith underlies and works through our entire person, we ourselves become members, which exist through and live as faithful. And when we take this kind of view of ourselves as members, then “the functioning organ must become an object”⁴⁹. Between the internal and external aspects of humanity and faith, it is our very own selves and bodies which are the principle of unity ^F. Faith is not bodily in the ordinary sense, but gains its bodily aspects through the body of faithful. Faith is orientated towards the most inward aspect of a person, but this goes beyond any of the differences in our ‘members’ which differentiate us, to the ground of what is ‘common to all’, so faith is also a principle that is profoundly ‘common to all’ the faithful as much as it is something personal in our ‘inmost being’. It is not differentiated into and compartmentalised to one part of our life, but is only differentiated through the unified community of faithful. As faith does not consist in the perception of an external object, it is actually correlated to the ‘human countenance’ which perceives things: it is greater than any individual perception. And similarly,

^F Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, Arbeiten Zur Geschichte Des Antiken Judentums Und Des Urchristentums 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2017). 284 – “Paul develops two distinct technical definitions of the word “body”. The first is the “basis of unity and relationship” and the second is the ecclesiastical “body of Christ”.

faith is not bodily in the ordinary sense of a ‘bodily thing’, a ‘thing of the body’: in a much greater way it is something which the body exists for and through.

The principle at work here, which makes sense of the relationship between these aspects of faith, is the same principle that underlies the thought of the New Testament: “radical... individualisation makes the universality of salvation [by faith] possible”⁵⁰. God’s distance from our ordinary world of experience and the presence of God by faith deep within us are connected ^G. So, just as “the word is near you... in your heart... you believe in your heart” (Rom 10:8-9), “the whole group of those who believed were of one heart” (Acts 4:32), simply by means of them being one whole group, ‘members of one another’. It is precisely because faith is found ‘in your heart’, in your ‘inmost being’ that there is “one faith... of all” (Eph. 4:5-6). For in a community of faith we must be determined by the shared faith to become ‘one’, and this kind of determining impact comes, not from a discrete or bodily process, but from within our very being. The importance of knowledge of self in faith is how it can be said that:

“the knowledge of God and of ourselves may be
mutually connected”⁵¹

so, to know God is to have,

“to come back to myself... entered deep within myself... and saw... above my
mind, the unchangeable light [God].”⁵²

yet it is equally true that:

“nor is there any hope that man in this principal part can himself know what he
is until he sees himself in his origin which is God”⁵³

^G “There arises a simultaneous insistence, which is an Augustinian characteristic, on the divine immanence and transcendence... both present and absent” (Johannes Quasten, *Patrology: The Golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicea to the Council of Chalcedon*, ed. Angelo Di Berardino, trans. Placid Solari (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1986). 410). cf. Augustine, *Confessions, Volume I: Books 1-8*, trans. Carolyn J. B. Hammond, Loeb Classical Library 26 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014). III,6,11, p.111 – “I was seeking you not by following my mind’s understanding... but according to my capacity for physical sensation. Yet you were deeper within me than the most secret part of me, and greater than the best of me.”

While we see faith within ourselves, faith is also contrasted with sight. As faith is so all-encompassing in both its certainty and its effects for the inward, subjective person, it is not so sufficient objectively and externally. As the conviction of faith is concentrated internally, it is limited externally. So, it could be said that faith is:

“only subjectively sufficient and at the same time held to be objectively insufficient”⁵⁴;

because:

“the faith of things that are absent is present”⁵⁵.

The subjective seeing of faith within oneself, which makes faith as present to ourselves as the self is present to itself, contrasts with an objective knowledge of something. Faith does not consist in the experience of something external which could make something objectively certain.

How can faith be both subjectively certain and objectively insufficient for certainty? If the assent of faith is certain, then it posits its object as present in certainty as well. The subjective conviction of faith seems to also exclude any awareness of its own objective insufficiency. From this perspective, faith is a subjective assent to something objective and this assent “relates to faith as a principle it presupposes”⁵⁶ because it does not rely on the observation of something external. This is because faith is an affirmation of the fact that the truth of faith is, in Aquinas’ language ^H, “objectively more certain by its

^H In its Aristotelian origins, Aquinas’ term, ‘simpliciter’ or ‘absolutely’ refers to the observation that “if anything is predicated in a greater or less degree, it also belongs absolutely [ὑπάρχει]... for an evil thing will never be described as possessing a greater or less degree of goodness than something else, but only of evil” (Aristotle, ‘Topics’, in *Posterior Analytics. Topica.*, trans. Edward Seymour Forster, Loeb Classical Library 391 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 265–740. 115b:4). “In the sphere of what is knowable in the absolute sense, attributes which are called *per se* as implying or implied by their subjects belong to those subjects in virtue of their own nature and of necessity” Aristotle, ‘Posterior Analytics’, in *Posterior Analytics. Topica.*, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library 391 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 1–264. 73b:17–20). Meanwhile, qualified predication, ‘secundum quid’ refers to those “predicates which apply only in a certain respect [κατά τι] or at a certain time or in a certain place” (Aristotle, ‘Topics’. 115b:13–4). For Aristotle, relative predication is simply a development of what is absolute: it is not a separate internal aspect; “for what is impossible absolutely is not possible in any respect” (115b:16). This is far from what we might associate with the word ‘subjectively’ because it still refers to an

nature”⁵⁷ and more evident because it is “held in the light of divine knowledge which cannot falter”⁵⁸. The whole point of faith is that it stands in connection with something that has is objectively evident, and the corresponding certainty is held in a subjectively sufficient act. In this sense, Aquinas can say that, according to “an unqualified evaluation... based on its cause... absolutely speaking, faith is more certain”⁵⁹. On the face of it, this contradicts the description of faith as objectively insufficient. The subjective certainty has objective elements which allow it to be described as certain in an objective way.

It is in this combination of the subjective assent of faith to something objective that we find the resolution to the tension between certainty and insufficiency. For when the subjective certainty of faith is considered ‘absolutely’, with regard to its object, it possesses an objective certainty. Faith can be called objectively or absolutely certain with regard to the cause and final end of faith,

objectively true aspect of an object, just not objectively true in all cases. So, the translation of Aquinas’ terminology, “ex parte subjecti” as “on a subjective disposition” (*Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Faith (2a2ae.1-7). Latin Text, English Translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossary*, trans. T.C. O’Brien, *Summa Theologiae* 31 (London: Blackfriars, 1974). II-II. q.4, a.8, p.145) is inadequate, and to translate “quoad nos” as “subjectively” is worse (*Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Christian Theology (1a.1). Latin Text, English Translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossary*, trans. Thomas Gilby, *Summa Theologiae* 1 (London: Blackfriars, 1964). I. q.1, a.5, ad.1, p.19). It seems that Aquinas altogether missed out on the notion of the subjectivity of faith which was so central to Augustine’s presentation.

This contrasts with the terminology of Kant, who says that the ‘grounds’ of faith are ‘subjectively sufficient’ and ‘objectively insufficient’. Grounds are, in general, a much more subjective concept: “that from which something can be cognized”, “a ground from which... everything can be understood, thus one from which nothing is lacking, is a sufficient ground” (Immanuel Kant, ‘The Blomberg Logic’, in *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–246. 29). Kant’s concern in his terminology for the objective and subjective aspects of faith is completely different from that of Aquinas: it is focused on the psychological or internal certainty which Augustine also made his starting point. This shows one of the deficiencies of Aquinas’ vocabulary; but also how, because they were speaking in different senses, it can be used alongside a Kantian vocabulary of faith. These different senses come from the fact that Kant insists that “truth and illusion are not in the object... but in the judgement about it” (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). A293/B350, p.384), but Aquinas can speak of something “certain by its nature” (Aquinas, *Christian Theology*. I. q.1, a.5, ad.1, p.19).

which result in its certain assent to objective things. This kind of certainty is the converse of faith's subjective certainty. But faith can also be considered in a way "qualified... relatively with respect to us"⁶⁰; this "aspect of certainty depends on its possessor"⁶¹. And viewed in this way, the subjective certainty of faith is connected to its objective insufficiency rather than its object. So, then it is relatively uncertain because the objective absence of faith is related to the objective state of the faithful person, which is in turn connected to that person's understanding of their faith. The 'qualified' aspect of faith is not completely subjective: it relates to the various parts of the faithful person, "the disability [sic.] of our minds" and "feeble human understanding"⁶² considered from a scientific approach. This relative uncertainty is the converse of faith's objective insufficiency, for it is with respect to the limited extent that we actually have the object of faith as a 'possession'. Both of these ways of approaching faith's subjectivity and objectivity are, in a sense, objective: either 'absolute' or turned towards the faithful subject in a way that is only qualified and still external.

But as faith has two aspects, there is also a further way to understand its internal aspect 'absolutely' and unqualifiedly. Within the aspect of faith which is 'qualified with respect to us', faith also has a subjective and objective aspect. The subjective aspect of faith 'with respect to us' is in fact something more than 'with respect to us': it is within us. Then, our perspective is converted again and the faith which assents within our inmost being, that is the subjective aspect of ourselves is completely certain; but because faith is not found as an object in our external lives, its objective aspect when considered with respect to us is one of uncertainty. Now the objective way of considering faith 'with respect to ourselves', and the objective insufficiency of faith are really one and the same because they are 'qualified' combinations of faith as objective and as subjective.

So, there are really three ways in which to view faith: the absolutely objective way with regard to faith's divine object which is certain, the relatively subjective way with regard to our relationship to faith which is uncertain, and the absolutely subjective way with regard to our act of faith which is certain. These three ways correspond "the one act [of faith] in its several references to the object of faith"⁶³. For each of these positions of subjectivity and objectivity, the act of belief stands in certain relations to them:

"the material object, in respect to which the act of faith is described as believing in God... the formal objective; in this respect the act of faith is described as believing God... [and] the object of faith viewed from the

perspective of the mind's being influenced by the will. Then the act of faith is described as believing unto God”⁶⁴.

Faith is ‘believing unto God’ not just because of its connection to the will, but because:

“Faith does not perfectly tend unto God as to the end unless it is joined with charity; therefore, the act of faith in God is defined by the act of love”⁶⁵

¹ Bultmann and Weiser, ‘Pistis’. 213

² Bauer et al., *BDAG*. 820

³ Philip Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom with Historical and Critical Notes*, 3 vols (New York: Harper, 1877). I:27, n.54

⁴ Hans Conzelmann, *Outline of the Theology of the New Testament*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1969). 172.

⁵ Udo Schnelle, *Theology of the New Testament*, trans. Eugene Boring (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Academic, 2009). 307

⁶ Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation 45 (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). XIII,2,5, p.374. cf. Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Florentiam, 1916). d.23, c.7, p.659; Brachtendorf, *Struktur Des Menschlichen Geistes*. 206-8.

⁷ Augustine, *Trinity*. XIII,2,5, p.375 rejects this option. cf. XIII,1,3

⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Fred Kersten, Edmund Husserl Collected Works 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983). 9

⁹ Gerard O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 96; cf. Luigi Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate*, Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 191.

¹⁰ cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Fred Kersten, Edmund Husserl Collected Works 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983). 9-10, 70

¹¹ Husserl. 52

¹² Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Fred Kersten, Edmund Husserl Collected Works 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983). 94 - “in infinitum imperfect”

¹³ Husserl. 8

¹⁴ Husserl. 52, cf. 70 – “Every perception of a physical thing has, in this manner, a halo of background-intuitions”; cf. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960). 23 – “in being there itself, the physical thing has for the experiencer an open, infinite, indeterminately general horizon, comprising what is itself not strictly perceived... that can be opened up by possible experiences”

- ¹⁵ Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation 45 (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). XIII,1,3, p.371
- ¹⁶ Karl Rahner, 'The Act of Faith and the Content of Faith', in *Science and Christian Faith*, trans. Hugh Riley, Theological Investigations 21 (Crossroad: New York, 1988), 151–61. 155
- ¹⁷ Hans Conzelmann, *Outline of the Theology of the New Testament*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1969). 171
- ¹⁸ Augustine, *Trinity*. X,9,12, p.306
- ¹⁹ Augustine. VIII,9,6, p.258. Compare Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). A96, p.227 - "the elements for all a priori cognitions... cannot indeed be borrowed from experience... but must always contain the pure a priori conditions of a possible experience"; B138, p.250 – in self-consciousness, "nothing manifold is given at all".
- ²⁰ Husserl, *Ideas*. 96
- ²¹ Kant, *KrV*. A96, p.227. cf. Kant. A116, p.237- "we are conscious a priori of the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves with regard to all representations that can ever belong to our cognition, as a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations"
- ²² Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. 66
- ²³ Augustine, *Trinity*. XIII,1,4, p.373. cf. Augustine. VIII,6,9, p.256- "we know the soul of anyone at all from our own"
- ²⁴ Augustine, *Trinity*. VIII,6,9, p.255 = Augustine, *De Trinitate, Libri XIII-XV*, trans. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50a (Turnhout: Brepols, 1953). 279 – "intime scitur"
- ²⁵ Husserl, *Ideas*. 96
- ²⁶ See Augustine, *Trinity*. X.10.14, p.308; cf. Michael Schmaus, *Die Psychologische Trinitaetslehre Des Heiligen Augustinus*, 2nd ed., Münsterische Beiträge Zur Theologie 11 (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlag, 1967). 238-9, 250. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. 22-3
- ²⁷ Augustine, *Trinity*. X,4,6, p.299 = Augustine, *Trinitate*. 318 – "non... 'totum sci', sed: 'quod scit tota scit'"
- ²⁸ Plotinus, *Enneads, Volume V*, trans. Arthur Hilary Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library 444 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984).3.1, p.73, cf. Edward Booth, 'St. Augustine's *Notitia Sui* Related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-Platonists', *Augustiniana* 28, no. 1/2 (1978): 183–221. 212
- ²⁹ Augustine, *Trinity*. X,9,12, p.306. It can "discern itself as present". cf. Schmaus, *Psychologische Trinitaetslehre*. 237 – "stellt er dem unmittelbaren ichbewußtsein die diskursive Erkenntnis des Wesens der Seele"
- ³⁰ Augustine, *Trinity*. X,9,12, p.306
- ³¹ Kant, *KrV*. B138, p.250
- ³² Plotinus, *Ennead V*. 3.5, p.85
- ³³ Augustine, *Trinity*. IX,5,8, p.277 = Augustine, *Trinitate*. 300 – "quamvis et singula sint in se ipsis et invicem tota in totis"
- ³⁴ Augustine, *Trinity*. X,3,5, p.298
- ³⁵ Augustine. X,3,5, p.297- "the mind seeks to know itself and is inflamed with this desire. Therefore, it loves".
- ³⁶ Augustine. VIII,6,9, p.259.

- ³⁷ Augustine, *Trinity*. XIII,2,5, p.375, cf. Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Florentiam, 1916). d.23, c.6, p.658
- ³⁸ Löhrer, ‘Glaube Und Heilsgeschichte’. 405. = “eine unmittelbare Bewusstseinsgegebenheit”.
- ³⁹ Augustine, *Trinity*. XIII,1,4, p.373.
- ⁴⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960). 110
- ⁴¹ Augustine, *Trinity*. XIII,1,4, p.373. cf. Augustine. VIII,6,9, p.256 - “we know the soul of anyone at all from our own”
- ⁴² Augustine, *Trinity*. XIII,1,3, p.371
- ⁴³ Augustine. XIII,2,5, p.376 = Augustine, *De Trinitate, Libri XIII-XV*, trans. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50a (Turnhout: Brepols, 1953). 387 - “aliquibus signis sese indicet, creditur potius quam videtur”
- ⁴⁴ Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. 111
- ⁴⁵ Husserl. 109
- ⁴⁶ Augustine, *Trinity*. IX,9,6, p.279
- ⁴⁷ Augustine. XIII,2,5, p.375
- ⁴⁸ Augustine. XIII,2,5, p.375
- ⁴⁹ Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. 97
- ⁵⁰ Hans Conzelmann, *Outline of the Theology of the New Testament*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1969). 172
- ⁵¹ John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols, Library of Christian Classics 20 (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960). I.1.3, p.39
- ⁵² Augustine, *Confessions*. VII,10,16, p.327, cf. Plotinus, *Enneads, Volume V*, trans. Arthur Hilary Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library 444 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984).3.4, p.83 – “the man who knows himself is double, one knowing the nature of the reasoning which belongs to soul, and one up above this man, who knows himself according to Intellect because he has become that Intellect; and by that Intellect he thinks himself again, not any longer as man, but having become altogether other and snatching himself up into the higher world”
- ⁵³ Martin Luther, ‘Disputation Concerning Man’, in *Career of the Reformer IV*, ed. Helmut Lehmann, trans. Lewis Spitz, The Works of Martin Luther 34 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1960). 134
- ⁵⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). A822/B830, p.684, cf. Immanuel Kant, ‘The Jäsche Logic’, in *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 517–640. p.583f; Andrew Chignell, ‘Belief in Kant’, *The Philosophical Review* 116, no. 3 (2007): 323–60. 336
- ⁵⁵ Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation 45 (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). XIII,1,3, p.372
- ⁵⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: Faith (2a2ae.1-7). Latin Text, English Translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossary*, trans. T.C. O’Brien, Summa Theologiae 31 (London: Blackfriars, 1974). II-II. q.4, a.8, p.145
- ⁵⁷ Aquinas, *Christian Theology*. I. q.1, a.5, ad.1, p.19 = Aquinas. 18 – “certius secundum naturam esse”

- ⁵⁸ Aquinas, *Christian Theology*. I. q.1, a.5, p.19
- ⁵⁹ Aquinas, *Faith*. II-II. q.4, a.8, p.145 = Aquinas. 144 – “judicatur simpliciter... secundum causam suam... fides est simpliciter certior”
- ⁶⁰ Aquinas, *Faith*. II-II. q.4, a.8, p.145 = “secundum autem dispositionem... secundum quid, scilicet quoad nos”
- ⁶¹ Aquinas. II-II. q.4, a.8, p.145
- ⁶² Aquinas, *Christian Theology*. I. q.1, a.5, ad.1, p.19
- ⁶³ Aquinas, *Faith*. II-II, q.2, a.2, ad.2, p.67
- ⁶⁴ Aquinas. II-II, q.2, a.2, p.67. = ‘credere Deo, credere Deum, et credere in Deum’. cf. Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Florentiam, 1916). d.23, c.4, p.656; Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John* 28–54, trans. John W. Rettig, The Fathers of the Church 88 (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1993). XXIX.6, p.18
- ⁶⁵ “fides non perfecte tendit in Deum tanquam in finem nisi prout est iuncta caritati; ideo actus credendi in Deum definitur per actum amandi” (Bonaventure, *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia 3 (Quaracchi, 1888). d.23, dub.3, p.502).